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Collapse of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue: Punching Shear  
Case Study  
Suzanne King, S.M.ASCE,1 and Norbert J. Delatte, M.ASCE2 
Abstract: On January 25, 1971, two thirds of a 16-story apartment building collapsed while under construction at 2000 Commonwealth 
Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts. Four workers died after a failure on the roof instigated a progressive collapse all the way to the basement, 
where the men were found. Fortunately, the collapse occurred slowly enough for most of the other workers to run to safety. An 
investigation, conducted by a commission assembled by the Mayor of Boston, painted a picture of a troubled project, with considerable 
confusion about responsibility for structural safety. The surviving workers’ descriptions of the failure provide a textbook definition of 
punching shear. Low concrete strength due to inadequate protection against cold weather contributed to low punching shear strength of the 
flat slab. Inspection, quality control, planning, and supervision were for all practical purposes absent from the project. This paper 
investigates the numerous causes and lessons learned of this structural failure. Two similar cases are also reviewed. 
CE Database subject headings: Collapse; Buildings, residential; Massachusetts; Boston; Structural failure; Case reports. 
Introduction 
Four workers died when about two-thirds of a 16-story apartment 
building under construction collapsed on January 25, 1971. The 
next day’s Boston Globe newspaper featured dramatic photo­
graphs of the remains of the collapsed structure. Two of the pho­
tographs accompanying the article are shown as Figs. 1 and 2. 
Rescue operations were delayed because of concerns about the 
stability of the remaining structure (Blake 1971). Nearly 71.6 MN 
(8,000 t) of debris were removed before the bodies of the workers 
could be recovered (Granger et al. 1971). A building that had 
been in development for over 6 years collapsed in a few minutes. 
Fortunately, the collapse occurred slowly enough that most of the 
men working on the site were able to escape. 
Punching shear was believed to have triggered the collapse. 
An investigation called for by the mayor found that there had 
been many errors and omissions associated with the apartment 
building. Over the long period of development, there had been 
many changes in the building’s owners and designers, leading to 
considerable confusion (Granger et al. 1971). Some of the key 
events are listed in Table 1. It is difficult to trace the project 
ownership and to determine who was responsible for the safety 
and structural integrity of the project. 
Design and Construction 
The building was a cast-in-place reinforced concrete flat slab con­
struction with a central elevator shaft core. This style of construc­
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tion is popular for multistory buildings because it reduces the slab 
thickness and the overall height of the building (Feld and Carper 
1997). The flat slabs were 190 mm (7 1/2 in.) thick, except for 
some bays near the elevator core and at stairwells, which were 
230 mm (9 in.) thick. This made possible a story height of 2.7 m 
(9 ft) for most of the floors. 
The building at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue was designed to 
be 16 stories high with a mechanical room above a 1.5-m (5-ft) 
crawl space on the roof. The building was 55.1 by 20.9 m (180 ft 
10 in. by 68 ft 6 in.) in plan. The floor plan is shown in Fig. 3. 
The structure also had two levels of underground parking. A 
swimming pool, ancillary spaces, and one apartment were located 
on the first floor and 132 apartments were on the second through 
sixteenth floors. Originally these apartments were to be rented, 
but the owners later decided to market them as condominiums 
(Granger et al. 1971). 
Construction began on the site late in the fall of 1969. Nearly 
all of the work was subcontracted. Only one representative from 
the general contractor was on site during construction. 
At the time of collapse, construction was nearing completion. 
Brickwork was completed up to the sixteenth floor and the build­
ing was mostly enclosed from the second to fifteenth floors. 
Plumbing, heating, and ventilating systems were being installed 
throughout various parts of the building. Work on interior apart­
ment walls had also started on the lower floors. A temporary 
construction elevator was located at the south edge of the building 
to aid in transporting equipment to the different floors. It is esti­
mated that 100 men were working in or around the building at the 
time of failure (Granger et al. 1971). 
After interviewing many eyewitnesses, the mayor’s investigating 
commission concluded that the failure took place in three phases. 
These phases were (1) punching shear failure in the main roof at 
column E5; (2) collapse of the roof slab; and (3) the progressive 
and general collapse of most of the structure (Granger et al. 
1971). 
Fig. 1. Chunks of concrete and wood were strewn across MBTA track (in foreground) by building collapse [from Boston Globe, January 26, 
1971; republished with permission] 
Phase 1: Punching Shear Failure in the Main Roof 
at Column E5 
At about 10 in the morning on the 25th of January, 1971, concrete 
was being placed in the mechanical room floor slab, wall, wall 
beams, and brackets. Placement started at the west edge and pro­
ceeded east. Later in the afternoon, at about 3 o’clock, most of the 
workers went down to the south side roof for a coffee break. Only 
two concrete finishers, Mr. D. N. and Mr. J. O., remained on the 
pouring level. 
Shortly after the coffee break, the two men felt a drop in the 
mechanical room floor of about 25 mm (1 in.) at first and then 
another 50–75 mm (2 or 3 in.) a few seconds later. The labor 
foreman, Mr. A. P., was directing the crane carrying the next 
bucket of concrete. He instructed the operator to ‘‘hold the 
bucket’’ and went down to the sixteenth floor by way of a ladder 
in the east stairway. That is when he noticed the punching shear 
around column E5. He stated: ‘‘I can’t believe my eyes. I see this 
slab coming down around the column.’’ (Granger et al. 1971, p. 
13). 
The carpenter foreman, Mr. A. F., was also in the area and 
immediately yelled a warning to the men working on the six­
teenth floor and roof of a possible roof collapse. The slab had 
dropped 125–150 mm (5 or 6 in.) around the column, and there 
was a crack in the bottom of the slab extending from column E5 
toward column D8. Column E5 is located directly below where 
the concrete was being placed for the mechanical room floor slab 
on the east side of the building, as shown in Fig. 3 (Granger et al. 
1971). 
Phase 2: Collapse of the Roof Slab 
After hearing Mr. A. F.’s warning, most of the workers in the area 
of column E5 managed to run to an east balcony and stay there 
until after the roof slab collapse. Eyewitness testimony concluded 
that the collapse happened fairly quickly. The roof slab began to 
sag in the shape of a belly and reinforcing steel began popping 
out from the mechanical room floor slab. The structure started to 
shake and the east half of the roof slab collapsed onto the six­
teenth floor. Then it stopped, giving the workers a chance to run 
down the stairs to the ground. 
At the time of failure, the structural subcontractor was placing 
reinforcing steel for the stairs on the fourteenth and fifteenth 
floors on the east side of the building. When the workers were 
making their way from the roof and floors above, most of them 
crossed over to the west side of the building when they reached 
the fifteenth floor (Granger et al. 1971). Thus, the portion of the 
building that remained standing, shown on the right side of Fig. 1, 
provided an escape for many of the workers that survived. 
Phase 3: General Collapse 
After the roof collapsed, the roof settled and most of the stranded 
workers could be rescued using the crane and construction eleva­
tor. However, about 10–20 min after the roof failed, the east side 
of the structure began to collapse. A resident of 1959 Common­
wealth Avenue described the collapse as a domino effect (or pro­
gressive collapse). The weight of the collapsed roof caused the 
sixteenth floor to collapse onto the fifteenth floor, which then 
collapsed on the fourteenth floor, and so on to the ground (Litle 
1972). 
At first the different floors were distinguishable, but later dust 
and debris made it difficult to tell them apart. When the dust 
finally settled, two-thirds of the building had collapsed. The east 
side and areas on either side of the elevator shaft were gone. Four 
workers were killed during the collapse, and 30 workers suffered 
injuries (Granger et al. 1971). The extent of damage is shown in 
Fig. 4. The elevator core probably prevented the collapse from 
propagating to the other half of the structure. 
Commission Investigation 
A commission of inquiry was selected by the mayor of Boston 
and convened a week after the collapse. The Associated General 
Contractors of Massachusetts, the Boston Society of Architects, 
Fig. 2. Building collapse; four men missing and three injured when 
apartment under construction collapsed in Brighton [from Boston 
Globe, January 26, 1971; republished with permission] 
the Boston Society of Civil Engineers, and the Boston Building 
and Construction Trades Council had representatives on the com­
mission. Professor William A. Litle of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology helped draft the commission report and later re­
ported on the failure (Litle 1972). 
The commission retained an engineering firm and a testing 
laboratory to aid in the investigation. The commission inter­
viewed a number of eyewitnesses, but suspended the interviews 
after about a dozen because there was no significant disagreement 
between the accounts (Granger et al. 1971). 
The commission made a number of important findings: 
•	 There were a number of irregularities in the issuance of the 
building permit. Key drawings were missing. Not a single 
drawing found in the file carried an architect’s or engineer’s 
registration stamp. The structural engineer refused to provide 
the calculations supporting his design to the commission. No 
principal or employee of the general contractor held a Boston 
builder’s license. At the time, partial drawings could be used to 
obtain a building permit, with the understanding that final 
•	 Ownership of the project changed a number of times, with 
changes in architects and engineers. This added to the overall 
confusion and contributed to the irregularities cited previously. 
Some of the key changes are outlined in Table 1. 
•	 The general contractor only had a single employee on site, and 
most subcontracts were issued directly by the owner to the 
subcontractors and bypassed the general contractor. At least 
seven subcontractors were involved. 
•	 The structural concrete subcontract did not require any inspec­
tion or cold weather protection of the work, although the de­
signer had specified these measures. There was no evidence of 
any inspection of the work by an architect or engineer, al­
though the project specifications required this. 
•	 The concrete mix designs were not prequalified. Such 
prequalification was a Boston Building Code requirement and 
stipulated that the performance of the proposed concrete be 
verified by laboratory testing. Some concrete deliveries did not 
contain the required air entrainment. Calcium chloride was 
used as an accelerator for some of the concrete, although it 
was specifically prohibited by the designer’s specifications. 
The designer’s specifications included a water-reducing ad­
mixture, which was used in only a small percentage of the 
concrete supplied. The Boston Building Code requirements for 
inspection and testing were not met on 65% of the days con­
crete was delivered to the project. Chemical analyses also sug­
gested that some samples had low cement content. 
•	 The triggering mechanism of the collapse was punching shear 
at the roof slab around column E5, probably preceded by flex­
ural yielding of the roof slab adjacent to the east face of the 
elevator core. 
The commission examined the failure from three aspects: 
•	 Whether failure would have been expected if the construction 
had conformed to the design documents; 
•	 Whether the construction procedures and materials conformed 
to the design documents; and 
•	 Whether the design documents met the building code require­
ments. 
The commission concluded that the failure would not have 
occurred if the construction had conformed to design documents, 
and that the construction procedures and materials were deficient. 
The most significant deficiencies were a lack of shoring under the 
roof slab and low strength concrete. The design documents speci­
fied a 28-day strength of 20 MPa (3,000 psi). At the time of the 
failure, 47 days after casting, the concrete had yet to achieve the 
28-day strength. 
There was some confusion as to whether the concrete at the 
point of the collapse had been cast on December 3 or 9, 1970. 
Both concrete placements had deficient strength, with 11 and 13 
MPa (1,600 and 1,900 psi) at 47 and 53 days, respectively. The 
commission believed that these two factors, lack of shoring and 
low concrete strength, were the principal cause of the collapse. 
However, the commission also found that the design did not 
meet code requirements for the slab thickness at column E5. The 
minimum thickness requirement was governed by deflection and 
not by strength, but a thicker slab would have provided a greater 
safety margin against punching shear (Granger et al. 1971). 
Although the structural plans limited construction loading to 
1.44 kPa (30 psf), actual loads were estimated to approach 6.22 
kPa (130 psf). Some boilers and construction equipment were 
stored on the roof at the location where the failure began. The 
locations of shores were specified on the structural plans, but 
stamped drawings would have to be supplied before construc­
tion could begin. 
these requirements were ignored (Granger et al. 1971). Witnesses 
reported that there were few shores. 
Table 1. Event Table for Construction of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue Apartment Building 
Date Action 
November 3, 1964 First building permit application was filed for a seven-story, 89 apartment building. B.C. is listed as owner 
and S. E. is listed as architect. Permit was first refused because building exceeded allowable building height. 
A later appeal granted the permit on December 24, 1964. 
May 24, 1965 Letter filed by W. L. of La Mont Corporation stated that construction of the building had started. Records show 
excavation was started and the lot was fenced. 
August 16, 1967 Notice was given to B. C. by the building department that his permit had lapsed due to unreasonable delay 
in completing the building. 
November 20, 1967 B. C. filed a new building permit for a 14-story, 85 apartment luxury building, naming G. G. architect. 
However, the permit was not signed by ‘‘the person who is to perform or take charge of the work covered 
by the permit’’ as specified by codes. Therefore, the permit was not issued. The application was then deemed 
abandoned because there was no permit issued within 6 months of application. 
July 3, 1968 A zoning change for the property was obtained by H. K. 
December 23, 1968 W. F. of Toronto, Canada; M. F. and T. H., both of Montreal, Canada; and A. H., B. C., H. K., S. R., and L. P., all 
of Massachusetts, are named owners of the property at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue. 
July 7, 1969 A permit was issued for a 16-story reinforced-concrete building designed by the architectural firm of W, Z, and M 
of West Toronto, Canada. However, Massachusetts state laws require permits to bear the seal of a registered architect 
or registered professional engineer from Massachusetts and the architectural firm of W, Z, and M does not have any 
principal or employees in Massachusetts. 
August 1, 1969 An excavation permit is issued to B. C. as the authorized agent for the owner and T. Construction Co. as contractor. 
August 27, 1969 Another building permit is applied for, this time naming J. P. as owner or authorized agent and T. Construction, Inc., 
as contractor. Also, the signature of D. M. of Cochituate, Mass., appeared in the space for the signature of a licensed 
builder. It is later revealed that D. M. was not a licensed builder at the time. 
August 29, 1969 A sworn affidavit states that the structural plans, drawn by M. S. Y. and Associates, were in accordance 
with the Building Codes of the City of Boston. 
September 4, 1969 There is a change of ownership. Two of the previous owners drop out and three more join the existing owners, 
called the 2000 Commonwealth Associates. 
September 5, 1969 The building permit is granted. However, the mayor’s commission’s report describes many irregularities and 
discrepancies-with this permit. 
Fall 1969 Construction begins on 16-story apartment building. 
Fall 1969 to 1970 Concept of building is changed. The owners will now sell the apartments as condominiums. A brochure is made, 
but no units are sold. 
November 10, 1970 Ownership changes yet again. This time M. A., B. C., and L. W. are made trustees of the 2000 Commonwealth 
Association Trust. 
January 25, 1971 Building collapses. 
The commission also noted a number of deficiencies and de­
viations with reinforcement placement. These included (Granger 
et al. 1971): 
•	 Omission of column ties in the bottom 1 m (39 in.) or so of 
several columns; 
•	 Concrete cover for vertical column bars varying between 13 
and 200 mm (1/2 and 8 in.) instead of the specified 48 mm (1 
7/8 in.). 
•	 One collapsed column had only six instead of eight 19 mm 
(3/4 in., U.S. #6) longitudinal reinforcing bars, with similar 
discrepancies in other columns. 
•	 East-west top slab steel was specified to be four 40.8 mm bars 
Fig. 3. Floor plan and location of column E5 [after Granger et al. (1971)] ( )0.3 m=1 ft
Fig. 4. Extent of collapse [after Granger et al. (1971)] (1 ft=0.3 m) 
(3/4 in., U.S. #6) and five 13 mm (1/2 in., U.S. #4). None of 
the larger bars were found, and the smaller bars were used 
consistently in place of the larger bars. 
•	 The vertical position of the slab reinforcement was erratic. In 
some cases, the top steel was at or below the middepth of the 
slab. 
•	 The collapse occurred near a construction joint, and the struc­
tural plans specified additional steel dowels across such joints. 
The witness testimony indicated that these dowels were not 
placed. 
Punching Shear Mechanism 
Punching shear is usually the critical failure mechanism for flat 
slab reinforced concrete structures. This mechanism is illustrated 
in Fig. 5. With this type of failure, the column and part of the slab 
punch through the slab as it moves downward. 
The force acting on the slab around a column overcomes the 
resistance and the slab falls down around the column. A portion of 
the slab is left around the column, but the remainder of the slab 
falls to the next floor. If the lower slab is unable to hold up both 
floors, then a progressive collapse will begin. 
Also, punching shear redistributes forces acting on the failed 
slab to other columns. If the other columns cannot carry the added 
weight, then the slab will start punching through the surrounding 
columns as well. Punching shear at one column can initiate a 
complete failure of a building. 
The punching shear strength of a flat slab (without shear rein­
forcement) depends on five factors (Ghosh et al. 1995): 
1. Concrete strength, 
2. Relationship of size of loaded area to slab thickness, 
3. Shape of loaded area, 
4. Shape of perimeter area, and 
5. Ratio of shear force to moment at slab-column connection. 
The punching shear strength Vc of a flat slab, for a simplified 
case of an interior column, may be expressed in U.S. customary 
units as (Ghosh et al. 1995): 
Vc =4.f ;b0d	 (1)c
where f ;=28-day cylinder compressive strength of the concrete; c
d=depth of the slab (measured from the bottom of the slab to the 
reinforcing steel location); and b0 =perimeter of the failure sur­
face around the column measured at distance d from the face of 
the column. For SI units the constant, 4, changes, but the relation­
ships between the variables remain the same. 
Therefore, the punching shear strength of a flat slab depends 
on concrete strength and slab depth. Punching shear strength var­
ies as the square root of the concrete strength. The effect of slab 
Fig. 5. Punching shear mechanism 
thickness is more than linear, because increasing d also increases 
b0 slightly. The lower concrete test strengths cited previously 
would lead to a punching shear capacity reduction of 20–27%. 
The low placement of top steel bars in the slabs would lead to an 
even greater reduction of punching shear capacity. 
Review of Causes of Failure 
A week after the collapse, Engineering News Record reported that 
there were three possible causes of structural failure under inves­
tigation: (1) formwork for the penthouse floor slab collapsing 
onto the roof; (2) a heavy piece of equipment falling from a crane 
and starting the progressive collapse; or (3) failure of weak con­
crete placed during previous cold days (‘‘Cause’’ 1971). After an 
extensive investigation, the mayor’s commission concluded that 
there were many flaws that contributed to the collapse. 
The committee determined that punching shear failure at col­
umn E5 triggered the initial collapse. The major areas of con­
struction that did not follow the design were shoring and concrete 
strength. Inadequate shoring under the roof slab on the east side 
of the building made it impossible for the roof to hold the freshly 
placed concrete for the mechanical room floor slab, the construc­
tion equipment, and the two boilers that were stored on that side 
of the building. Also, the concrete strength of the roof slab was 
well below the 20 MPa (3,000 psi) specified in the design 
(Granger et al. 1971). 
Deficient concrete strength could be attributed to poor quality 
concrete, improper curing, or both. Tests indicated that the 
amount of cement in the concrete was sufficient, but records sug­
gested that the maximum permissible slumps were consistently 
exceeded. The slump specification was only met in 37 of 240 
tests. This could indicate too much water, leading to lower 
strength concrete. 
Also, testimony indicated that the specifications for concrete 
protection in cold weather were not followed. Average curing 
temperature from the day of placement until the day of collapse 
was -4°C (25°F). The concrete was not protected against the 
effects of cold weather. The commission believed that poor curing 
seriously retarded concrete strength gain (Granger et al. 1971). 
The commission also found that the reinforcing steel details 
did not provide for sufficient steel crossing columns or for suffi­
cient development length. One important detailing error was that 
the bottom slab bars were not long enough to tie into the core 
walls. Furthermore, significant differences were found between 
the structural drawings and the location and amount of steel in the 
parts of the building that were recovered. In some locations, as 
little as one-half of the specified top slab steel was actually 
placed. There were no ties in column splice regions. Although 
these errors did not contribute to the initiation of the collapse, 
they probably influenced the speed and extent of the propagation 
of the failure (Granger et al. 1971). 
Design and Detailing Concerns 
The design and detailing concerns that contributed to the collapse 
include insufficient length and placement of rebar and various 
structural design deficiencies. The steel was delivered by the sup­
plier in bundles with marks on the steel indicating the intended 
use and location in the structure. However, some of the marks 
used were the same as the marks on the design plans, yet had a 
different meaning. 
For example, the supplier gave marks for bars at the south 
edge of the slab that were identical to marks given on the engi­
neer’s drawings for top slab bars over column E5. The commis­
sion was unable to determine what procedures were used to actu­
ally select and place the reinforcement, and how confusion in the 
field with regard to the bar markings may have contributed to the 
collapse (Granger et al. 1971). 
There were also detailing errors in the reinforcement. Some of 
the bars were not long enough to provide adequate development 
into the columns and walls as required by code, and placement of 
bars in some of the slabs was not sufficient to meet the American 
Concrete Institute’s (ACI) code at the time. ACI required that at 
least 25% of the negative slab reinforcement in each column strip 
pass over the column within a distance of ‘‘d’’ on either side of 
the column face (Granger et al. 1971). This requirement was not 
fulfilled. 
The Commission found that the slab should have been 222 
mm (8 3/4 in.) thick to satisfy the ACI 318-63 (ACI 1963) code 
requirements. However, this limit is based on deflection, and not 
on strength (Granger et al. 1971). It should be emphasized that 
there were no indications of inadequate design. Rather, the build­
ers failed to adhere to the plans and specifications, and the owner 
failed to provide for proper inspection of the work. 
Procedural Concerns 
There were many procedural concerns in the construction of 2000 
Commonwealth Avenue. For all practical purposes, there was no 
supervision of the construction. Nearly every step of construction 
was flawed (Kaminetzky 1991). Some of the major concerns in­
clude lack of proper building permit and field inspection, prema­
ture removal of formwork, and lack of construction control. 
The investigating committee determined that if the construc­
tion had had a proper building permit and had followed codes 
then the failure could have been avoided. Since there were nu­
merous problems that all played a part in the collapse, deciding 
whom to hold responsible for the collapse became difficult. Own­
ership changed hands many times, and most jobs were subcon­
tracted. Some of the transactions that took place with Boston’s 
Building Department are listed in Table 1 (Granger et al. 1971). 
There was confusion surrounding the project from the start. 
Construction did not follow the structural engineer’s specifi­
cations for shoring or formwork. Before removal of shores and 
forms, the concrete must first reach 70% of its designated 28 day 
strength in order to meet that specification. It was the commis­
sion’s opinion that, despite 7 day cylinder tests that said other­
wise, the average strength of the concrete in the roof slab was 
only 13 MPa (1,900 psi) after at least 47 days, not the required 
14.5 MPa (2,100 psi) for removal or the specified 20 MPa (3,000 
psi) required after 28 days. The reason for disregarding the tests 
was the difference between the curing conditions in the laboratory 
and at the project—the concrete on site would gain strength more 
slowly in cold weather conditions, while laboratory specimens are 
cured at a specified temperature and humidity. There was no in­
spection or cylinder testing performed for the east side of the 
building, so removal of formwork was based on values obtained 
from the west side of the building. Furthermore, there was no 
shoring under the roof slab below the freshly placed mechanical 
room floor slab (Granger et al. 1971). 
Finally, there was very little construction control on the site. 
There was no architectural or engineering inspection of the 
project, and the inspection done by the City of Boston was inad­
equate. The design plans specifically stated that certain aspects of 
the project needed to be approved by an architect, yet no architect 
or engineer was consulted. Instead, construction was based on 
arrangements made by the subcontractors. As mentioned before, 
there was only one representative from the general contractor, and 
this man was not a licensed builder. He did not direct, supervise, 
or inspect any of the work done by the subcontractors (Granger 
et al. 1971). 
Similar Cases 
The progressive collapse of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue was 
similar to the later structural failures of buildings at Bailey’s 
Crossroads and Harbour Cay. On March 2, 1973, the Skyline 
Plaza in Bailey’s Crossroads, Virginia, collapsed while under con­
struction. Like 2000 Commonwealth Avenue, premature removal 
of shoring and insufficient concrete strength were suggested as 
the causes of failure. Low temperatures led to an estimated con­
crete compressive strength of only 6.6–9.9 MPa (960–1,440 psi) 
at the time of the collapse. A National Bureau of Standards (NBS, 
now National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST) in­
vestigation team determined that punching shear failure at the 
twenty-third floor caused a partial collapse that propagated to the 
ground. Fourteen workers were killed and 34 were injured 
(Carino et al. 1983). 
The collapse of the flat-plate Harbour Cay condominium 
building in Cocoa Beach, Florida, on March 27, 1981, was caused 
by a punching shear failure that triggered a progressive collapse, 
much like 2000 Commonwealth Avenue and Skyline Plaza. 
Eleven workers were killed and 23 were injured. An NBS inves­
tigation team that included two individuals who had investigated 
the Skyline Plaza collapse determined that the slab thickness of 
203 mm (8 in.) did not meet the ACI code minimum of 279 mm 
(11 in.). Also, the top reinforcing steel was placed too low, reduc­
ing d from 160 mm (6.3 in.) to 135 mm (5.3 in.). As a result, the 
calculated punching shear stresses exceeded capacity (Lew et al. 
1982). 
Investigations following the three collapses concluded that 
both design and construction errors contributed to the cause of 
collapse. All three failures could have been avoided if better in­
spections of materials and construction details were conducted. 
The papers by Lew et al. (1982) and Carino et al. (1983) and 
other related documents were compiled by the American Concrete 
Institute for a seminar in Avoiding Failures in Concrete Construc-
tion (ACI 1989). In fact, a punching shear failure in Indianapolis 
was reported as early as 1911 (Feld 1978). 
Lessons from This Case 
The Bailey’s Crossroads and Harbour Cay collapses resulted in 25 
deaths and 58 injuries combined (Lew et al. 1982; Carino et al. 
1983). These could have been avoided if the engineers working in 
Virginia and Florida had learned the lessons of the 2000 Com­
monwealth Avenue collapse. 
This case also illustrates the need for proper shoring of con­
crete construction. Many failures over the years have occurred 
due to insufficient shoring or premature removal of shoring and 
formwork. 
Some of the causes of the failure and contributing factors are 
summarized as follows: 
•	 The owner did not provide competent involvement of design 
quirements. 
professionals with knowledge of design and construction re- b0 = 
•	 The contractor did not reshore the slab that failed. 
•	 Concrete, possibly of poor quality, was not adequately pro­
tected against cold weather. 
•	 Low top bars in the slab led to inadequate slab depth. 
•	 Construction loads on the roof slab were too high. 
•	 There was no inspection by an architect or engineer, only poor 
inspections by the City of Boston building inspector, and no 
inspection by the general contractor’s representative (who was 
not a licensed builder). The owner did not provide quality 
control of the structural work, and the contractor did not com­
ply with structural specifications. 
Conclusions 
Many lessons can be learned from the collapse of 2000 Common­
wealth Avenue. The mayor’s investigating commission made rec­
ommendations for improving the City of Boston’s Building 
Codes. However, the commission also reported that, if the con­
struction of 2000 Commonwealth Avenue had fully complied 
with existing codes, then the collapse would not have occurred. 
The commission was dismayed that the project could have pro­
gressed through so many phases without the errors and omissions 
being found and corrected. 
The commission made recommendations to prevent similar 
collapses in the future. These included changes in assigning re­
sponsibility and ensuring competence of design, construction, and 
inspection of major buildings, as well as additions to organization 
and staff competence of the Building Department. At the time of 
the failure, the Building Department had 130 employees but only 
two registered professional engineers, and no registered architect. 
In addition, changes in building codes to prevent propagation 
of a local failure into a general collapse were recommended. In 
order to facilitate these changes, the commission recommended 
that the technical findings of the report be made generally avail­
able. In the opinion of the writers, this has not been achieved— 
the Commission’s report is not available for loan and must be 
photocopied at the Boston Public Library. 
Finally, this case and the cases of Bailey’s Crossroads and 
Harbour Cay Condominium illustrate the importance and progres­
sive nature of punching shear failure. This is a critical failure 
mechanism for concrete structures of this type. Structural safety 
depends on adequate slab thickness, proper placement of rein­
forcement, and adequate concrete strength. 
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Notation 
The following symbols are used in this paper: 
perimeter of failure surface around column measured at 
distance d from face; 
d = depth of slab (measured from top or bottom of slab ‘‘Cause of fatal collapse unknown.’’ (1971). Engineering News Record, 
to reinforcing steel location for positive and negative Feb. 4,13. 
moment, respectively);
 
f ; = 28-day cylinder compressive strength of concrete;
 c
and 
Vc = punching shear capacity of slab, units of force. 
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